05 December 2006
HOW WOULD SYRIA BENEFIT?
The question is why would Syria order the assassination of Gemayel? Unlike the rest of his family he was a junior player, famous only for his surname. His grandfather founded the Phalangist, what could hve appeared to be a knock-off of the Brownshirts. This group has lost a lot of its standing because it collaborated first with Israel and then with Syria.
Gemayel assassination bears no earmark of a Syrian attempt. Remote controlled bombs were the norm. His assassins stop his car and shot him many times, while allowing his driver to escape. Why would Syria risk such an outcome?
Now, the gunmen escaped, if they had not the contract originator would be known. How does one commit this act on a busy street? My opinion, his attackers knew him by sight, in other words he was known to them.
Now we come to the political stuff. The assassination by Syria makes little sense since Assad's value to the region and his possible influence could be jeopardized. Plus the possibility of Assad being an ally to the US
in the worsening conditions in Iraq is becoming more and more likely.
Even world papers are questioning the Syria connection to the assassination. The International Herald Tribune, stated, Syria is on a semi-roll now in the political arena, so why would they want to kill this opportunity?
The Israeli newspaper, Ha'aretz says, "pure political and diplomatic logic makes it difficult to see Damascus behind the assassination."
Syria has no benefits from the assassination of Gemayel. They are close to getting the semi-official stamp from Washington as the one of the only countries that can help calm things down in Iraq.
THE ASSASSINATION
When Gemayel was assassinated a report was issued by the United Nations about the use of cluster bombs in Lebanon. But unfortunately, this story was pushed from the headlines with the assassination of Gemayel. Convinient? Possibly? Coincidence? possibly? I was taught that nothing happens coincidently.
The report I am speaking of was issued by UN investigators which found "Israel had engaged in a significant pattern of excessive, indiscriminate and disaprp portionate force, that constituted a falgrant violation of international law."
Some 90% of the cluster bombs were dropped in the final three days before the ceasefire went into effect. For those who do not know a cluster bomb contains smaller anti-personnel mines, if you will. This has turned Southern Lebanon into a "no man's land". This made the agricultural land unuseable until the mini mines are removed, which could take a very long time.
The report also found that the bombing of the infrastructure, which Isreal said it was targeting Hezbollah, was actually damage inflicted for the sake of destruction. At least some of the bombing, not all.
So Israel's good luck continues. So far nothing has been reported about the findings of the UN of "collective punishment" against the people of Lebanon. THe good timing of the assassination, gave Israel the chance to accuse Syria, without any substantial evidence, which, of course, the US repeated, still without any evidence, other than someone's opinion.
Was this a coincidence? Only the truth will bring the facts to light, but I foresee that the light is off and the US controls the switch.
A brilliant piece of irony!
25 October 2006
DOES THIS SOUND FAMILIAR?
Vietnamization
Nixon was elected President and began his policy of slow disengagement from the war. The goal was to gradually build up the South Vietnamese Army so that it could fight the war on its own. This policy became the cornerstone of the so-called "Nixon Doctrine". As applied to Vietnam, the doctrine was called "Vietnamization".
During this period, the United States conducted a gradual troop withdrawal from Vietnam. Nixon continued to use air power to bomb North Vietnam and Viet Cong forces in the south. The U.S. also attempted to disrupt North Vietnam's supply system by attacking the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the lead-up to withdrawal. The U.S. attacked North Vietnamese bases inside Cambodia, used its influence to achieve a change in government in Cambodia that led to the closing of Cambodian ports to North Vietnamese war supplies, and persuaded South Vietnam to launch a massive but ultimately unsuccessful operation into Laos to shut down the part of the Ho Chi Minh trail that traversed that country. More bombs were dropped on Vietnam under the Nixon presidency than under Johnson's, and U.S. casualties fell significantly. The Nixon administration was determined to remove U.S. troops from the theater while strengthening the ability of the ARVN to defend the south.
One of Nixon's main foreign policy goals had been the achievement of a breakthrough in U.S. relations with China and the Soviet Union. An avowed anti-communist early in his political career, Nixon could make diplomatic overtures to the Russian and Chinese communists without being accused of having communist sympathies. The result of those overtures was an era of détente that led to nuclear arms reductions in the U.S. and Soviet Union and the beginnings of a dialogue with China. In this context, Nixon viewed the Vietnam War as simply another limited conflict forming part of a bigger tapestry of superpower relations; however, he was still doggedly determined to preserve South Vietnam until such times as he could not be blamed for what he saw as its inevitable collapse (a "decent interval"). To this end he and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger employed the Chinese and Soviet foreign policy gambits to successfully defuse some of the anti-war opposition at home and secured movement at the negotiating table in Paris.
China and the U.S.S.R. had been the principal backers of the Vietnam People's Army through large amounts of military and financial support. The two communist powers competed with one another to prove their "fraternal socialist links" with the communist regime in the north. That support would increase in the years leading up to the U.S. departure in 1973, enabling the North Vietnamese to mount a full-scale conventional war against the south, complete with tanks, upgraded jet fighters, and a modern fuel pipeline snaking through parts of Laos and North Vietnam.
Nixon was roundly criticized for his heavy bombing of Hanoi in December 1972, which was partly facilitated by his diplomatic overtures to China, and which followed a breakdown in the Paris peace talks after peace appeared close at hand. Agreement had been reached in October 1972 between Kissinger and chief North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho, but the agreement was rejected by South Vietnamese President Thieu, who demanded dozens of changes to the text, including the critical demand that North Vietnamese troops had to withdraw from South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese rejected this, and then countered with many changes of their own. Nixon responded with Operation Linebacker II, which was condemned by one journalist as "war by tantrum." The bombing of Hanoi did, however, pressure North Vietnam back to the negotiating table, allowing America, and Nixon, a face-saving, or "decent interval", exit
20 October 2006
THE BEGINNING
Here are the parts of the House Resolution to go to war. See any lies?
The Resolution cited several factors to justify action:
- Iraq's noncompliance with the conditions of the 1991 cease fire, including interference with weapons inspectors
- Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction, and programs to develop such weapons, posed a "threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region"
- Iraq's "brutal repression of its civilian population"
- Iraq's "capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people"
- Iraq's hostility towards the United States as demonstrated by the 1993 assassination attempt of former President George H. W. Bush, and firing on coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones following the 1991 Gulf War
- Members of al-Qaida were "known to be in Iraq"
- Iraq's "continu[ing] to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations," including anti-United States terrorist organizations
- Fear that Iraq would provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists for use against the United States
- The efforts by the Congress and the President to fight the 9/11 terrorists and those who aided or harbored them
- The authorization by the Constitution and the Congress for the President to fight anti-United States terrorism
14 October 2006
TODAY 14/10/06
Al-Sistani's influence declining in Iraq
By HAMZA HENDAWI, Associated Press WriterFri Oct 13, 4:47 PM ET
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani once wielded so much influence he seemed to single-handedly chart the post-Saddam Hussein political future in Iraq. Now, the country's top Shiite cleric appears powerless as Iraq edges toward civil war.
With dozens of Iraqis dying daily from Sunni-Shiite reprisal killings, the failures of al-Sistani's pleas for peace underline a major power shift in the Shiite establishment.
"Their political interests now outweigh religious interests," said Mustapha al-Ani, a Dubai-based Iraqi analyst. "To some extent, the need for al-Sistani's endorsement is no longer a prerequisite to gain power. Those with street credibility and a militia now have the power."
It's a major shift from the more than two years following Saddam's ouster, when Shiite leaders hung on al-Sistani's every word concerning politics. His opposition to U.S. plans for elections and a constitution forced the Americans to make dramatic changes. His calls for Shiites to avoid violence were largely adhered to.
But priorities for Shiite political parties have changed and their leaders no longer appear to feel the need to be seen to be closely associated with al-Sistani to gain legitimacy.
The swing has stripped the Shiite clergy, with the Iranian-born al-Sistani at its head, of much of its influence and given a lead role to followers of anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who does not recognize al-Sistani's religious authority.
It is a power shift that does not bode well for Iraq's Shiite-dominated government or the U.S.-led military coalition as they try to contain the stubborn Sunni insurgency and the wave of sectarian killings that has swelled since last winter.
Al-Sadr's supporters are widely suspected in many of the attacks on Sunni Arabs. His militiamen, who staged two revolts against U.S. troops in 2004, also have clashed with U.S. and Iraqi soldiers in Baghdad and southern Iraq in recent weeks.
Al-Sistani has responded to the bloodshed with a mixture of resignation and a deep sense of disappointment, said an official who is in regular contact with al-Sistani in the southern holy city of Najaf.
"He keeps praying for peace," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he is not authorized to speak to the media. "He feels the pain every day, but he has no magic wand. He tells visitors every day that what's happening does not please God or his prophet and has nothing to do with Islamic teachings."
Al-Sistani's last public statement on the crisis in Iraq came more than three months ago, when after a meeting with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, he publicly upbraided the leader for the government's failure to bring security.
Although al-Sistani has steadfastly refused to meet with U.S. officials, he counseled Shiites not to take up arms against the Americans. In 2004, he personally intervened to broker a truce that ended weeks of fighting between al-Sadr's militiamen and the U.S. military in Najaf.
In statements earlier this year, al-Sistani emotionally appealed for peace between the Shiite majority and the once-dominant Sunni minority.